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Abstract
This paper sheds new light on the determination of environmental policies in majoritarian
federal electoral systems such as the U.S., and derives implications for the environmental federalism
debate on whether the national or local government should have authority over environmental policies.
In majoritarian systems, where the legislature consists of geographically distinct electoral districts, the
majority party (at either the national or the state level) favors its own home districts; depending on the
location of polluting industries and the associated pollution damages, the majority party may therefore
impose sub-optimally high or low pollution taxes due to a majority bias. We show that majority bias
can influence the social-welfare ranking of alternative government policies and, in some cases, may
actually bring distortionary policies closer to the first-best solution.
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1. Introduction
There is a long-standing debate in the economics literature about whether environmental policies
should be set by local or national policy-makers (see Oates and Portney (2003) for a survey), but this
“environmental federalism debate” has mainly ignored the effects of political institutions.1,2 In a
majoritarian system such as the U.S., with geographically distinct electoral districts, the majority
political party (whether in Congress or state-level legislatures) tends to favor the social welfare of its
home districts over other districts (see Pashigian, 1986). This gives rise to a “majority bias” (see also
Grossman and Helpman, 2005) at both levels of government.3 Our objective in this paper is to analyze
the environmental policy effects of a majoritarian electoral system and derive implications for the
environmental federalism debate.
The role of geographic location has rarely been discussed in connection with political institutions
and environmental policy determination. This appears to be a serious deficiency. The political location
of the polluting source and the political location of exposure to the associated pollution damage are
important for understanding the design of environmental policy. For example, the U.S. steel industry is
heavily concentrated in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia. With the switch in U.S. Congressional
majority party in 1994, the (Democratic) legislators from these states were no longer in the majority
party; on an index of majority representation, the steel industry (SIC 3312) went from 51st out of 415
industries in 1993 to 208th in 1997.4 Over that same time period, the steel industry saw its pollution
abatement operating costs increase by 11%, relative to an overall decrease of 27% in manufacturing

1

Oates (1972) established that in a federal system, policies addressing spillover effects should be centralized, whereas they
should be decentralized when there is a high degree of heterogeneity in preferences.
2 A recent literature discusses the role of political institutions (such as parliamentary versus presidential-congressional
systems) for cross-country variations in environmental and fiscal policies (see, e.g., Fredriksson and Millimet, 2004, and
Persson et al., 2000, respectively).
3 Majoritarian systems such as the U.S. system are particularly grounded in local interests (Milesi-Feretti, 2002; Grossman
and Helpman, 2005). Under majoritarian electoral rule with single-member districts, political parties may focus on a subset
of the population rather than maximizing social welfare (Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 2003).
4 The majority representation index measures the extent to which an industry is over-represented in majority-party states
relative to the population of those states; for more details on this variable and the pollution abatement cost comparison, see
Appendix A.

3

industries overall. In our view, the change from majority to minority representation may help explain
this increase.
We argue in this paper that the legislative majority tends to favor industries (by formulating less
stringent environmental policies) that are disproportionately located in majority party districts. This is
particularly true if they emit transboundary pollution that affects primarily minority districts.5 This is
true at both the federal and state level, and has important implications for the design of government
policy. Cross-district uniform policies have the advantage that they limit the majority party legislators’
ability to favor their own home districts at the expense of other districts represented by the minority
party. We also show that majority bias influences the social-welfare ranking of alternative policies.
Although district-specific environmental taxes set by the federal government are optimal when
governments maximize social welfare (accounting for both transboundary pollution and heterogeneity
in pollution damage across districts), uniform federal policies across districts (states) or decentralized
policies may actually be socially optimal when governments exhibit majority bias. This is due to the
fact that majority bias does not necessarily decrease social welfare in the presence of distortionary
government policy. Indeed, majority bias may actually provide a counterweight to inefficiencies that
arise from the need for uniform taxes when taxation is centralized, or from ignoring transboundary
pollution under a more decentralized tax policy.
There is indeed some empirical evidence that geographical concerns have played a role for
federal environmental policies, although no theoretical underpinnings have been provided. Pashigian
(1986) argues that federal air quality standards (the prevention of significant deterioration) set by the
1970 Clean Air Act and its later amendments were designed to impose high costs (and thus slow factor
mobility) on the fast-growing South and West. These regions had superior air quality relative to the
northern urban areas of the U.S., many of which were not directly affected by the policies. In this case,
5

The greater is the share of the sector’s capital stock located in majority districts, the greater the marginal cost of raising the
pollution tax from the majority legislative delegation’s point of view, while the marginal benefits in terms of improved
environmental quality and tax revenues remain constant.
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a legislative coalition was able to impose strict standards mostly at the expense of legislative minority
states.6
The theoretical political economy literature on environmental federalism is rather slim. Oates and
Schwab (1988) discuss a median-voter model with decentralized policy-making, multiple jurisdictions
and mobile capital, and a population of workers and non-wage-earners. Median-voter rule implies that
the majority will impose its preferred policy on the minority in each jurisdiction and the resulting
policy outcome is inefficient. They do not incorporate districts represented by different political parties
in a legislature. Fredriksson and Gaston (2000) analyze a similar model with multiple jurisdictions and
mobile capital, but where the government’s policy decision is taken under the influence of worker and
capital-owner lobby groups. They argue that centralized and decentralized environmental policy
outcomes are equivalent, because the aggregate effects on income of environmental regulations are
identical under either regulatory design. While workers carry the whole burden in the decentralized
case (with capital competition), capital owners share this burden in the centralized case (without capital
competition).
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 outlines the model and section 3 solves for socialwelfare maximizing policies, section 4 discusses majoritarian policy, and section 5 outlines the
implications for the environmental federalism debate. Section 6 concludes.

6

Ackerman and Hassler (1981) argue that early SO2 policy was a result of collaborations between producers of high sulfur
coal and environmental lobby groups. This resulted in the use of scrubbers (causing a reduction of SO2) and high sulfur coal
(raising SO2) from the eastern part of the U.S. The remaining empirical literature focuses on possible strategic interaction in
state or national government policy-making. Murdoch et al. (1997) find free-riding among 25 European economies in
voluntary sulfur and nitrogen oxide emission reductions. Sigman (2005) reports free-riding by U.S. states in water pollution
management, while Sigman (2002) argues that countries also free-ride in their river pollution clean-up efforts. List and
Gerking (2000) and Fomby and Lin (2006) find no environmental quality effect of President Reagan’s decentralization of
environmental policy-making during the 1980s, and Millimet (2003) finds no impact on abatement costs of this event.
Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) find strategic interaction among U.S. states’ environmental policy-making, and
Fredriksson et al. (2004) suggest that this interaction may encompass several policy instruments (also non-environmental).
For theoretical models studying strategic interaction in the presence of capital competition and transboundary pollution, see,
for example, Rauscher (1994), Levinson (1997), Markusen et al. (1993, 1995), Glazer (1999), Ulph (2000), McAusland
(2002), and Kunce and Shogren (2002, 2005).
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2. Model
A small open economy has individuals living in an odd number K of geographically and
politically separate districts. The economy has a total population normalized to unity. Each individual i
living in geographic district j, j ∈ {1,..., K }, consumes G + 1 goods and has quasi-linear preferences

given by
G

K

G

U ij = xoi + ∑ u ( x gi ) − ∑∑ X kgθ g γ kgj
g =1

(1)

k =1 g =1

where xoi represents i’s consumption of the clean numeraire good 0, u(.) is a differentiable and strictly
concave function of consumption x gi of polluting good g, g ∈ {1,..., G}, X kg is sector g output
produced in district k, k ∈ {1,..., K }, while θ g is the pollution coefficient (pollution intensity) of sector

g production; γ kgj is the pollution exposure intensity coefficient, which reflects the extent to which
residents of district j suffer from sector g pollution emitted in district k; i.e., when k ≠ j it represents
the degree of transboundary pollution between districts. The numeraire good has world and domestic
consumer and producer price equal to unity, while good g has world and domestic consumer price p *g .
The legislature sets a pollution tax t kg in district k for sector g, and thus district k producers receive a
net price in sector g which equals pkg = p *g − t kgθ g .
Individual i located in geographic district j with budget B ij spends

[

numeraire goods, where demand for good g is given by d g ( p *g ) = u ' ( x g )

]

−1

G

∑p
g =1

*
g

d g ( p *g ) on non-

and where individual-

specific superscripts are dropped since the consumption quantities of all non-numeraire goods and the
associated consumer surplus are equal for all individuals. The remaining part of the budget is spent on
numeraire good 0; this is assumed to equal a positive amount.
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The numeraire good is produced from labor only with constant returns to scale and an inputoutput coefficient equal to unity. Assuming positive production of the numeraire good yields a wage
rate equal to one. Good g ∈ {1,..., G} production requires labor and a sector specific input. With a fixed
wage rate, the aggregate factor reward for district k producers in sector g, π kg ( pkg ) , depends on the

producer price of good g in district k only. Each individual receives wage income. The consumer

[

]

surplus derived from consumption of good g equals s g ( p *g ) ≡ u d g ( p *g ) − p *g d g ( p g* ) . Since by
assumption, p *g and thus s g do not depend on environmental taxes, we omit consumer surplus in the
following welfare formulae. The government collects pollution tax revenue in district k’s sector g given
by rkg (t kg ) = X kg ( pkg )θ g t kg , where, by Hotelling’s Lemma, X kg ( pkg ) = π 'kg ( pkg ) is the domestic supply
of good g by district k producers. We assume X kg ' > 0 and X kg ' ' = 0. To keep things simple, we assume
that capital of any sector g located in district k is exclusively owned by district k residents; i.e., if
industry g earns profit π kg in district k, this profit is received by residents of k.
Let λ j be the population share of district j residents. The aggregate income level of district j is
G

K

G

Y j = λ j + ∑ π jg ( p jg ) + λ j ∑∑ rkg (t kg ),
g =1

(2)

k =1 g =1

where the terms on the right-hand side equal labor income, capital income, and net transfer income,
respectively. It is assumed throughout that any national (or state, where applicable) government
revenue is redistributed to districts according to their population share. Finally, adding disutility from
pollution to (2) gives the aggregate social welfare level of residents in district j, equal to
G

K

G

K

G

W j = λ j + ∑ π jg ( p jg ) + λ j ∑∑ rkg (t kg ) − ∑∑ X kg ( pkg )θ g γ kgj .
g =1

k =1 g =1

k =1 g =1
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(3)

3. Benchmarks: Welfare Maximization in Centralized and Decentralized Systems
In this section, we derive four basic welfare-maximizing policies. Although these have
previously been shown in the literature, they serve as useful benchmarks for comparisons with the
political equilibrium tax rates (discussed in Section 4 below) that usually deviate from the welfaremaximizing policies. The central government may set either (i) district-specific pollution tax rates for
each sector, or (ii) a uniform sector-specific tax that applies to all districts. The district-specific central
policy has two clear advantages over the other policies: namely, it can tailor taxation to the situation in
a particular district and at the same time, it takes into consideration any spillover effects that production
in a district can have on other districts. In a world without political distortions, this policy is clearly the
first-best solution; yet, in the real world, the federal uniform policy usually prevails, based on the
uniformity of standards principle. (As we discuss later, the presence of majority bias may provide an
additional rationale against centralized district-specific policy.) If local differences in policies are
desired, the central government can transfer the right to set policies to subnational entities, such as
districts or states that then have the right to set jurisdiction-specific environmental taxes. We now
derive the two centralized (federal district-specific and federal uniform) welfare-maximizing tax
policies and the two decentralized (district and state uniform) welfare-maximizing tax policies,
respectively.

3.1 Welfare-Maximizing Federal Tax Policies
We start by deriving the welfare-maximizing policy when the federal government sets districtspecific pollution tax rates for each sector g.

Lemma 1: The “federal welfare-maximizing district-specific tax policy” in sector g for district k equals
K

t kg0 = ∑ γ kgj ,

∀g, k .

(4)

j =1

8

K

Proof: Calculating the first-order condition of the sum

∑W
j =1

j

from (3) by choice of t kg , noting that

dpkg / dt kg = −θ g , and solving yields (4). Q.E.D.

If the federal government can set different environmental tax rates for different districts, then the
first-best optimal tax rate t kg0 for good g production in district k equals the sum of the transboundary
pollution coefficients of district k production.
A federal government may alternatively (and much more commonly) set a tax rate which applies
to all districts.

Lemma 2: The “federal welfare-maximizing uniform tax policy”, t gf , equals

t gf =

where

1
∂X g
∂pg

∂X g
∂p g

⎡ ∂X kg
⎢
∑
k =1 ⎢
⎣ ∂pg
K

K

∂X kg

k =1

∂p g

=∑

K

∑γ
j =1

kgj

⎤
⎥,
⎥⎦

∀g ,

(5)

.

Proof: Maximizing the sum of (3) over all districts j and restricting district tax rates to a uniform

policy value t g , we find (5). Q.E.D.

The centralized optimal tax t gf depends on the aggregated marginal exposure to damage per unit
of pollution, and cannot vary by district. Instead, the centralized optimal tax in (5) is a weighted
average of the optimal rates t kg0 in (4), using as weights the relative district-level output adjustment

9

∂X kg

∂X g

∂p g

∂p g

to net price changes. Eqn. (5) suggests that while a uniform policy takes transboundary

pollution damage fully into account, it introduces distortions compared to the district-specific policy in
(4). A uniform policy cannot tailor the industry tax rate by district according to district-specific
variations in transboundary pollution. Thus, in sum:

Corollary 1: A federal district-specific pollution tax is weakly preferred to a federal uniform pollution

tax when the federal government maximizes social welfare.

When environmental damage differs across districts, federal district-specific pollution taxes are
strictly preferred to federal uniform pollution taxes; the former policies are efficient since they allow a
federal government to control for both transboundary pollution and differences in environmental
damage across districts. However, when environmental damage is uniform across districts (i.e., γkgj = γg,

∀k , j , g ) , then federal district-specific and federal uniform policy are equivalent.

3.2 Welfare-Maximizing Decentralized Tax Policies
We now contrast the centralized (federal) welfare-maximizing environmental policy with its fully
decentralized (district) welfare-maximizing counterpart. The local government of district j maximizes
G

G

g =1

g =1

K

G

W jd = λ j + ∑ π jg ( p jg ) + ∑ r jg (t jg ) − ∑∑ X kg ( p kg )θ g γ kgj .

(6)

k =1 g =1

Eqn. (6) differs slightly from (3) because with decentralized decision-making, the district itself has tax
authority and thus collects its own tax revenue (whereas in (3), it is assumed that the district population
receives part of the centrally collected tax revenue according to population share).
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Lemma 3: District j’s “locally optimal pollution tax policy”, t djg , equals
t djg = γ jgj ,

∀g , j.

(7)

Proof. Maximizing (6) by choice of t djg yields (7). Q.E.D.

Eqn. (7) reveals that when policy-making is carried out at the district level, only the pollution
damage affecting the district itself is addressed, and transboundary pollution is completely ignored.
Finally, we can derive the state-level welfare-maximizing policy. State s sets an industry-specific
environmental tax that applies to all districts located in the state. Denote the set of these districts by S.

Lemma 4: State s’ “optimal uniform pollution tax policy”, t gs , equals

1
t =
∂X gs
s
g

∂p gs

⎡ ∂X kgs
⎢ s
∑
k ∈S ⎣
⎢ ∂p g

∑γ
j∈S

Proof. Maximizing the sum

kgj

⎤
⎥,
⎦⎥

∑W
j∈S

d
j

∀g , s.

(8)

from (6) by choice of a uniform tax rate t gs yields (8). Q.E.D.

The state’s optimal pollution tax differs from its federal counterpart in (5) in two respects. First,
transboundary pollution outside the state is ignored, which makes the state policy inferior to the federal
policy, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, provided that the price response of district output is more
similar within the state than within the nation, the weighting present in (8) is less distorting than in (5).

4. Majoritarian Politics in Centralized and Decentralized Systems
We now drop the assumption that policy-makers maximize aggregate welfare of all districts.
Instead, we assume that in a majoritarian system, the majority party in both national and state

11

legislatures maximizes the welfare of the legislators’ home districts only (consistent with Grossman
and Helpman, 2005). Thus, effects of the majoritarian political system are present both in federal- and
state-level policy-making, but absent in district-level policy-making.
Each district j is represented by one single legislator who is affiliated with party H ∈ { A, B} ,
where the legislator is assumed elected with an exogenous probability 0.5, with independence across
districts. Legislators in the majority delegation care only about average citizen welfare in their home
districts. The majority party is represented by at least (K+1)/2 legislators in the federal (or state)
legislative body, and we denote the set of majority districts by M. We assume that members of the
same party are able to provide each other with compensation in the form of political side payments or
inter-temporal trades, and hence the majority delegation maximizes its party representatives’ joint
welfare. Their joint welfare is given by

WM =

∑W
j∈M

j

,

(9)

where W j is defined as in (3). The equilibrium environmental policy is determined as the policy which
maximizes the majority party legislators’ joint welfare, given by (9).

4.1 Majority Bias: Federally Set District-Specific Taxes
To obtain a clear understanding of the effects of a majoritarian system on environmental policy,
we start with the scenario that the federal government sets district-specific tax rates. Note that the
optimal tax rate is then given by Lemma 1, i.e. (4). Let Λ M denote the population share of majority
districts.

12

Proposition 1: The “federal district-specific equilibrium tax policy” in sector g in district k equals
K
K
δ M − Λ M X kg
1
1
γ
γ kgj =
t kg = ∑ γ kgj − k
+
−
∑
∑
kgj
Λ M θ g ∂X kg Λ M j∈M
ΛM
j =1
j =1
1
23
1444244
43
A
C
∂pkg
144
42444
3

∑ γ kgj −
j∈M

δ kM − Λ M X kg
,
Λ M θ g ∂X kg

∀k , g. (10)

∂pkg

B

Proof: The federal government maximizes
G

G

K

K

G

Λ M + ∑ ∑ π kg ( pkg ) + Λ M ∑ ∑ r kg (t kg ) − ∑ ∑ X kg ( pkg )θ g ∑ γ kgj ,
g =1 k∈M

g =1 k =1

k =1 g =1

(11)

j∈M

by choice of t kg . Rearranging the first-order condition gives (10). Q.E.D.

Term A in (10) equals the optimal tax rate t kg0 , given by Lemma 1. Terms B and C in (10) are
majority bias terms and are ambiguous in sign. Term B appears when the majority party has won only a
subset of districts; when it has won all districts, the profit-decreasing effect and the tax-revenue
increasing effect of a tax increase offset each other.7 If district k is a majority district ( δ kM = 1 ), term B
is negative because the profit reduction of an increased tax rate would occur in a majority district,
whereas only part of the tax revenue increase would go to majority districts. Term B is positive if
district k is a minority district ( δ kM = 0 ) because in this case the government does not value district k
profits. The sign of term C depends on both the share of the majority district population and the
damage caused by transboundary pollution by industry g of district k in majority districts. Term C
increases with (i) declining majority population percentage, and (ii) increasing concentration of
transboundary pollution in majority districts, holding the sum of transboundary pollution coefficients
constant. If both the population and transboundary pollution are concentrated in majority districts, term
C disappears. Finally, the right-hand side of (10) makes clear what matters to the majority party when
the federal government can set district-specific taxes. When sector g pollution damage does not affect
7

If all districts are majority districts, maximization of majority welfare is the same as social welfare maximization, and
majority bias is not an issue.
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majority districts, majority districts (δ kM = 1) will see pollution subsidized, i.e. a pronounced majority
bias is observed.

4.2 Majority Bias: Federal Uniform Taxes
In the following, let AgM denote the share of sector g production located in majority districts.

Proposition 2: The “federal uniform equilibrium tax policy” in sector g equals

t

fM
g

1
=
∂X g

K

∂X kg

K

∑ ∂p ∑ γ
k =1

g

j =1

kgj

+

Λ M − AgM
ΛM

θg

⎡ 1
⎢
⎣⎢ Λ M

Xg
1
+
∂X g ∂X g

∂X kg

K

∑ ∂p ∑ γ
k =1

g

j∈M

K

kgj

−∑
k =1

∂X kg
∂p g

K

∑γ
j =1

kgj

⎤
⎥=
⎦⎥

∂p g
∂p g ∂p g
14
4424443 144
42444
3 1444444442444444443
B

A

C

(12)
=

Λ M − AgM
ΛM

Xg
1 1
+
∂X
∂X g Λ M
θg g
∂pg
∂p g

K

∂X kg

∑ ∂p ∑ γ
k =1

g

j∈M

kgj

, ∀g.

Proof: In the political equilibrium, the uniform pollution tax policy vector maximizes
G

G

K

G

Λ M + ∑ ∑ π kg ( p g ) + Λ M ∑ r g (t g ) − ∑ ∑ X kg ( p g )θ g ∑ γ kgj .
g =1 k∈M

g =1

k =1 g =1

(13)

j∈M

Taking the derivative of (13) with respect to t g , we find an equilibrium characterization of the tax set
in sector g equal to
(Λ M − AgM )θ g X g − Λ M θ g2

∂X g
∂pg

K

∂X kg

k =1

∂pg

t g + θ g2 ∑

∑γ
j ∈M

kgj

= 0,

∀g .

(14)

Rearrangements yield (12). Q.E.D.

Term A in (12) equals t gf , the optimal uniform tax given in (5), whereas terms B and C reflect
forms of majority bias. In term B, the profit decrease of industry g capital owners located in majority
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districts is compared to the tax revenue increase of these districts’ population; term B equals zero only
in the knife-edge case when the profit share AgM of industry g capital owners in majority districts equals
the population share Λ M of majority districts. Term C shows that the effect of transboundary pollution
on the pollution tax also depends on the population and the transboundary pollution distribution.
Similarly to (11), this part of the majority bias disappears when population and pollution damage are
concentrated in majority districts.
The right-hand side of (12) focuses on the net political bias components of interest. Moreover, if
the majority districts are unaffected by pollution damage, the federal uniform equilibrium tax policy in
sector g is positive (negative) when the majority districts own a disproportionally small (large) share of
the sector g capital stock.
The following corollaries discuss majority bias further.

Corollary 2: The equilibrium federal uniform pollution tax in sector g is decreasing in the share of

sector g capital stock owned by majority districts.

Proof: Differentiation of (14) with respect to AgM yields

dt gfM
M
g

dA

=

Xg

∂X g
( Α − 2Λ M )θ g
∂pg

∀g ,

(15)

M
g

where the denominator is negative since by definition, Λ M > 0.5 and Α Mg ≤ 1. Hence, (15) is negative.
Q.E.D.

The intuition is that, ceteris paribus, the greater is the share of sector g capital stock owned by
majority districts, the greater is the marginal cost of raising the pollution tax to the majority legislative
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delegation (while the marginal benefits in terms of improved environmental quality and tax revenues
remain constant). This helps explain the intuition behind the anecdotal evidence from the steel industry
related in the introduction; an industry that is primarily located in minority districts will face more
stringent regulations than other industries.8
Next, we investigate the effect of greater exposure to pollution (less absorption of pollutants).

Corollary 3: Whereas increased exposure to pollution in a majority district yields a positive pollution

tax policy response, increased exposure to pollution in a minority district yields no pollution tax policy
response.

Proof: Differentiation of (14) with respect to the pollution exposure coefficient, γ kgj , assuming district

j is a majority district, yields

dt

fM
g

dγ kgj

−θg
=

∂X kg
∂p g

( Α − 2Λ M )
M
g

∂X g

∀g , k , j,

(16)

∂p g

where the denominator is negative (as in (15)), and thus (16) is positive. Differentiation of (14) with
respect to γ kgj , assuming district j is a minority district, yields no effect. Q.E.D.

Thus, when majority bias is present, the government reacts to an increase in pollution damage
only to the extent that it affects the majority district population.

8

However, if capital shares and population are distributed proportionally across majority and minority regions, then
governments will be unable to discriminate against minority districts given the constraint of federal uniformity. In that case,
majority bias is not a factor affecting policy, provided there is no heterogeneity in pollution damage.
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Corollary 4: Majority bias may bridge the gap between the “federal welfare-maximizing district-

specific tax policy”and the actual “federal uniform equilibrium tax policy.”

Proof: The optimal policy is given by t kg0 in (4), and the actual policy by t gfM in (12) which is equal to
t gf in (5) plus the majority bias terms B and C. Suppose that t gf > t kg0 : In this case, a negative term B in

(12), caused by a profit share of capital owners in majority districts that lies below the majority
population share, and/or a negative term C, caused by a pollution damage mainly located in minority
districts, can bring down the difference between t kg0 and t gfM . Suppose on the contrary that t kg0 > t gf : In
this case, a positive term B and/or C can bridge the difference. Q.E.D.

4.3. Majority Bias: The State Level
We now calculate the tax rates in the political equilibrium when states set pollution taxes. If the
majority party in the state legislature sets a uniform tax rate, this leads to a mix of both decentralized
and centralized policy features. The resemblance to federal centralized policy arises because tax rates
are uniform across districts and majority bias is potentially present. But the policy also has
decentralized features, namely better tax tailoring with regard to industry characteristics within the
state, and the disregard for transboundary pollution beyond state lines.
In state s, the state majority legislature maximizes
G

ΛsM + ∑

∑π

g =1 k∈M s

s
kg

G

G

( p gs ) + ΛsM ∑ ∑ rkg (t gs ) − ∑∑ X kg ( p gs )θ g
g =1 k∈S

g =1 k∈S

∑γ

kgj

,

(17)

j∈M s

where production-related terms in districts outside state s are omitted because the state government
s
cannot influence them via taxation. The set M s consists of all majority districts of state s, and Λ M

denotes the population share of state s majority districts as percentage of the state population. We find
the following result:
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Proposition 3: In a majoritarian system with state-level environmental policy-making, the uniform

equilibrium pollution tax for sector g in state s is given by
t

Ms
g

⎡ ∂X kgs ⎛ 1
⎞⎤
⎤ ΛsM − AgMs X gs
1
⎜
γ kgj ⎥ +
+
γ kgj − ∑ γ kgj ⎟⎟⎥ ∀s, g.
∑
∑
s
s ∑⎢
s ⎜ s
s
∂X g k ∈S ⎢ ∂p g ⎝ Λ M j∈M s
∂X
ΛM
j ∈S
j ∈S
⎥⎦
⎠⎦⎥
⎣
θ g sg
s
s
∂p g
∂p g ∂p g
144424443 144
42444
3 14444444244444443

1
=
∂X gs

⎡ ∂X kgs
⎢ s
∑
k ∈S ⎢
⎣ ∂pg
A

B

C

(18)
Proof: The first-order condition characterizing state-level policy-making equals
− A θ X + Λ θg X − Λ θ
Ms
g
g

s
g

s
M

s
g

s
M

2
g

∂X gs
∂p gs

t +θ
s
g

2
g

∂X kgs

∑ ∂p ∑ γ
k∈S

s
g

j∈M s

kgj

=0

∀s, g ,

(19)

where AgMs is defined as share of sector g production in state s located in a state majority district. Then
simply solve (19) for t gMs . Q.E.D.

Clearly, the federal tax rate (12) and the state tax rate (18) are structurally similar. Both consist
of the welfare-maximizing unified tax given in term A and two majority bias terms B and C. However,
whereas these terms depend on the distribution of production and pollution in the federation when the
policy is chosen at the federal level, they only depend on the distribution of production and pollution
within the state when the environmental policy is decided at the state level. Moreover, (18) only
captures transboundary pollution in majority districts in the state. Thus, ceteris paribus, the influence
of transboundary pollution on the tax in (18) will be smaller than in (12), since the latter reflects all
transboundary pollution affecting majority districts across the nation. Thus, free-riding problems are
likely to be accentuated with decentralized majoritarian policy-making.
Finally, note that if industry location is non-uniform across states and districts, sector g pollution
taxes will vary (perhaps sharply) across states; this depends on the degree to which the sector g capital
stock is located in majority districts. State policy-making may therefore exhibit great dispersion in
pollution tax rates.
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5. Majoritarian Politics and the Environmental Federalism Debate
5.1. Federal Uniform vs. Federal District-Level Policy-Making
An implication of the above analysis is that the existence of majority bias always introduces a
wedge between the federal district-specific policy and the optimal policy. However, it may actually
reduce the wedge between the federal uniform policy and the optimal policy. Thus in some cases, the
existence of majority bias may result in the federal uniform policy being preferred to federal districtspecific policy.
In the following, we further outline this intuition (by studying the case when there are districts
represented by the minority party; i.e., we do not consider here the case where all legislators are
members of the majority party).

Corollary 5: In the presence of majority bias, a federal uniform pollution tax policy may be strictly

preferred to a federal district-specific pollution tax policy. In particular, this is the case if pollution
damage is uniform, and population and production are distributed symmetrically across all districts.

Proof: Assume that pollution damage is uniform across districts, i.e. γkgj = γg, ∀k , g , j . Assume further

that Λ M = AgM = M / K , where M and K are the number of majority districts and total number of
districts, respectively; i.e., capital shares and populations are distributed proportionally across majority
and minority districts.9 Then, the federal uniform tax policy, given by (12), equals
K

t gfM = ∑ γkgj = Kγ g = t kgo , i.e., the federal uniform tax policy is equivalent to the optimal federal districtj =1

specific tax policy given in (4) (Lemma 1). On the other hand, the federal district-specific tax policy,
given by (10), equals
9

Note that this need only be true in aggregate: i.e., if the majority party represents 54% of the population, it also represents
54% of the capital stock in sector g.
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1
t kg =
ΛM

∑γ
j∈M

kgj

K M
δk − 1 X
δkM − ΛM X kg
kg
−
= Kγ g − M
≠ t kgo ,
∂X kg
ΛM θ g ∂X kg
θg
∂pkg
∂pkg

i.e. the federal district-specific tax policy is not equivalent to the optimal federal district-specific tax
policy due to majority bias. Q.E.D.

In practice, federal district-specific taxes are rarely observed. This paper provides an efficiency
explanation for this observation, based on the presence of majority bias in federal policy.10 As shown
in Corollary 5, federal district-specific tax policy is distorted by majority bias, leading to sub-optimally
high (low) pollution taxes in minority (majority) districts. However, the distortions created by majority
bias are lessened by the use of a federal uniform policy. Intuitively, requiring environmental taxes to
be uniform across districts places a constraint on the ability of governments to favor majority districts
and punish minority districts.11 In sum, we find that when policy-making suffers from majoritarian
bias, a federal uniform policy may be preferred over district-specific federal policies.

5.2. State-Level vs. Federal Policy-Making
Oates (1972) showed that federal uniform policies are preferred when transboundary pollution
problems are present, whereas decentralized policies are preferred when pollution varies widely across
districts. Decentralized policies ignore transboundary externalities, whereas federal uniform policies
ignore differences in pollution creation across districts. Without majoritarian bias, federal district-level
taxation combines the advantages of decentralized and centralized policy-making and is thus first-best.

10

Other explanations may include administration costs or the presence of imperfect information; this may be a topic for
further research.
11 Federal uniform policies may also avoid sharp policy reversals as the majority party (with different constituency districts)
changes after an election loss by the incumbent party.
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If majoritarian bias is present, however, state-level policy-making may be actually preferred even to
federal district-level policy-making as the following Corollary 6 shows.

Corollary 6: State-level environmental taxes may be strictly preferred to both uniform and district-

level federal taxes in the presence of majority bias if the state legislature is relatively homogeneous
compared to the federal legislature (meaning the degree of majority bias is small at the state level and
large at the federal level) and transboundary pollution across state lines is not a major problem.

Proof: As an illustration, consider the extreme case where the environmental damage coefficient is

constant across districts, i.e. γkgj = γ g , ∀ k, g, j, and there is no transboundary pollution across state
lines. Assume further that all districts at the state level are majority districts, whereas there are some
minority districts at the federal level. In this case, the state-level taxes given by (18) equal the federal
district-specific first-best tax level in (4), whereas the district-level federal tax policy in (10) and the
uniform federal tax policy in (12) are usually suboptimal since they suffer from majority bias. Q.E.D.

If states are more homogeneous than a federation as a whole, the presence of majority bias
provides an additional explanation why state-level environmental policy may be preferred to federal
policy.

6. Conclusion
Our results yield new insights applicable to the environmental federalism debate: should
environmental policy be decentralized or centralized? Majority bias, favoring the current majority party
legislature’s home districts, affects both levels of policy-making. The degree to which majority bias
drives a wedge between optimal and actual policy outcomes depends on whether factors of production
and pollution damage are located in majority or minority party districts. In particular, we find a novel
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argument for uniform (across districts) federal policy-making: such policies reduce the majority
legislators’ ability to favor its own home districts and disfavor the districts represented by the minority
party. Majority bias also affects the optimal choice between state-level and federal policy. In sum, we
show that the presence of majority bias can change the ranking of government policies and, in some
cases, may bring distortionary policies closer to the optimal policy.
These theoretical results may provide guidance for future empirical work on the determinants of
environmental taxation in majoritarian political systems, since they suggest that empirical studies
should be on the lookout for majority bias as an environmental policy determinant.
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Appendix A
A.1 Majority Representation Variable
We constructed a variable measuring the extent of each industry’s majority representation as
follows. For each state, the difference between the percentage of industry employment located in that
state and the population share of that state is computed.
For industry employment, we used County Business Patterns, which gives employment by 4digit SIC for each state. Since many observations are censored, it also gives the number of
establishments in various size classes. These data are also available at the national level (with far
fewer censored observations). Following Busch and Reinhardt (2000), we compute the mean
establishment size at the national level for each size class. We then estimate total employment in the
industry for each state using the national industry average for each size class, and the number of firms
in each size class by state. Note that, following Busch and Reinhardt, we use the imputed data even
when the actual data are not censored. The percentage of industry employment in each state is
estimated using the sum across states as the denominator (so that the percentages sum to one for each
industry).
To construct the index, we then sum this measure over only those states in which more than
50% of the House delegation is in the majority party.
Although the pollution abatement costs (see section A.2 below) are available for 1994 and
1999, we use majority representation for 1993 and 1997 due to lags in the setting of policy.

A.2 Environmental Stringency Variable

The pollution abatement costs for the steel industry are from Becker and Shadbegian (2005),
page 85. Note that the standard measure of environmental policy stringency at the industry level (the
“Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures” survey) was discontinued in 1994, and reintroduced in
a significantly revised form in 1999. The steel industry is one of the few industries that maps easily
from 1994 to 1999. The estimate of a 27% decline in pollution abatement operating costs across all
manufacturing industries is from Becker and Shadbegian (2005).
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